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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 2004, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") assumed a
new role as a highly specialized, global regulator of domestic
telecommunications policy. In April 2002, the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body established an arbitration panel in accordance with Article 6 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes in response to a complaint filed by the United States against the
Republic of Mexico. The United States alleged that Mexico had violated its
commitments under Section 5 of the Annex on Telecommunications to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") by failing to ensure
that Teldfonos de Mdxico, S.A. de C.V. ("Telmex"), the largest Mexican
supplier of basic telecommunications services, (1) provide interconnection
to U.S. telecommunications carriers at "cost-oriented" rates, (2) refrain
from anticompetitive practices' , and (3) provide U.S. telecommunications
1. United States First Written Submission on Mexico-Measures Affecting
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carriers "reasonable and non-discriminatory" access to public
telecommunications networks and services as mandated by the GATS
Annex on Telecommunications.
In its April 2004 decision, the WTO arbitration panel found that
Mexico had not met its GATS commitments with respect to supply of
telecommunications services on a "facilities basis"-that is, services
supplied over the service provider's own infrastructure, rather than over
leased capacity on someone else's infrastructure.2 As a result, Mexico
became obliged to change its domestic telecommunications regulations or
face trade sanctions. The panel report in the U.S.-Mexico decision is the
first WTO arbitration to deal solely with trade in services under GATS and
the first specifically to address telecommunications services.
On one level, the decision illustrates the potential for the WTO to
compel changes in any area of domestic law that corresponds to one of the
topics within GATS. It is conceivable that, having established the
precedent of intervening in the domestic regulatory policy of one of its
signatory nations, the WTO will one day direct this new form of
iuberregulation toward a United States regulatory institution that has
oversight of domestic firms providing at least one service to foreign
customers. On another level, the U.S.-Mexico decision provides an
additional example of the U.S. government's recurrent use of trade
agreements and institutions to impose specific U.S. regulatory principles on
the domestic telecommunications policies of other nations. As the Authors
will explain in greater detail below, that exportation of U.S.
telecommunications regulation encompasses detailed methodologies used
to calculate the costs and permissible prices of regulated carriers. Despite
having been exported to other nations, those U.S. policies remain highly
controversial within U.S. telecommunications law.3
This Article presents an economic analysis of the United States'
Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204, at 9 para. 36, 79 para. 207 (Oct. 3, 2002),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring.Enforcement/
Dispute SettlementWTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset upload-file638-6333.pdf
[hereinafter United States Government Written Submission].
2. WTO Dispute Panel Report on Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications
ServicesWT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu.e/204r-e.pdf [hereinafter WTO Dispute Panel Report].
3. See Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J. Gregory Sidak, Exporting Telecommunications
Regulation: The United States.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 317, 319 (2002). The conclusive evidence of the controversy surrounding the
United States' unbundling policy is that the FCC's rules, regarding the parts of the local
network that must be unbundled, have been struck down by the Supreme Court or D.C.
Circuit three times. See United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 561 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
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complaint against Mexico. Part II summarizes the lengthy decision of the
WTO arbitration panel. The panel accepted most of the arguments and
reasoning contained in the United States' complaint. Therefore, our
criticisms of the U.S. government's complaint in most cases apply with
equal force to the WTO decision.
Part III shows that the U.S. government conflated international
settlement rates and domestic interconnection pricing. In both the United
States and Mexico, international settlement rates have been set by a
different pricing methodology than the one used for domestic
interconnection. Contrary to the unstated premise of the U.S. government's
complaint, direct comparisons of the two rates are not valid. The complaint
of the U.S. government raised economic policy questions that are not
within the scope of the WTO agreement. These policy questions are
properly addressed by the domestic authorities in Mexico. For example, the
recovery of Telmex's total costs through allowed rates is properly within
the discretion and expertise of the Mexican telecommunications regulator,
the Comisi6n Federal de Telecomunicaciones ("Cofetel").
At the time that the United States filed its complaint, Mexico's
international settlement rates were reasonable and were rationally based on
the costs of building and operating the public-switched telecommunications
network in Mexico. The U.S. government mischaracterized several of the
relevant cost principles. First, the U.S. government's estimate of the costs
of terminating a call in Mexico ignored non-traffic-sensitive ("NTS") costs
that Telmex cannot recoup through other charges. Second, international
settlement rates vary by region to reflect the legitimate differences in costs
that Telmex incurs in providing network access. Third, the U.S.
government incorrectly relied on long-run average incremental cost
("LRAIC") as the price that a competitive market would establish.
Moreover, the U.S. government's complaint did not recognize that the price
of northbound long-distance services in Mexico depends primarily on the
cross-subsidization policy chosen by the Mexican government. This policy
is also within Cofetel's discretion, and the U.S. government did not allege
that this cross-subsidization was anticompetitive.
Part IV demonstrates that, setting aside these cost-justification issues,
the U.S. government was advocating a policy that would not necessarily
increase the welfare of consumers in the United States. Any complaints
regarding the price of southbound long-distance services should have been
directed instead to the United States Department of Justice for investigation
of tacit collusion, as the market for southbound long-distance calls into
Mexico was, at the time that the United States filed its brief before the
WTO, highly concentrated by antitrust standards. Although reductions in
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international settlement rates appear to be correlated with lower
international long-distance prices for U.S. consumers, the declines in those
prices on calls to Mexico would have been greater had the big three U.S.
long-distance carriers-AT&T, WorldCom-MCI, and Sprint-competed
more aggressively. Just as competition among U.S. long-distance carriers
will naturally reduce southbound long-distance prices, competition among
Mexican long-distance carriers has and will continue to put downward
pressure on international settlement rates. Indeed, international experience
shows that domestic competition in outbound international services brings
substantial reductions in international settlement rates.
Part V shows that the WTO panel failed to recognize that the
complaint of the U.S. government collapses if Telmex lacks market power
in point-to-point international telecommunications services between the
United States and Mexico. It is unlikely that Telmex had such market
power in 2002. Point-to-point international telecommunications services-
not -the termination of long-distance calls onto Telmex's wireline
network-constitute the relevant product market. For several reasons,
Telmex lacks market power in the relevant product and geographic
markets. First, Telmex's share of point-to-point international
telecommunications services varies by geographic market within Mexico
and is declining rapidly. Second, the demand for southbound calls into
Mexico is price elastic, which implies that U.S. consumers would quickly
substitute away from southbound calls terminated onto Telmex's network
in response to a price increase for southbound calls. Third, the supply of
termination access by rival networks in Mexico is price elastic, which
implies that producers would quickly increase their capacity in response to
an increase in the price of termination by Telmex. Fourth, Telmex does not
enjoy a significant advantage over its rivals with respect to cost structure,
size, or resources.
Even if one were to assume counterfactually that Telmex has market
power in the relevant product and geographic market, Cofetel could
regulate an exercise of market power in international settlement rates.
Further, even if one were to assume counterfactually (as the WTO panel
incorrectly found) that the proper market definition is the termination of
southbound calls, Telmex would still lack market power for at least five
reasons. First, the market power of U.S. long-distance carriers is a
countervailing force that constrains Telmex's ability to charge excessive
international settlement rates. Second, illegal bypass forces Telmex to
negotiate lower international settlement rates. Third, Telmex is already
substantially below the benchmark international settlement rate established
by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to protect U.S. long-
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distance carriers. Fourth, the critical share of customers needed by Telmex
to render an exercise of market power unprofitable is small because the
ratio of marginal cost to fixed cost of completing southbound calls is low.
Fifth, packet-switched networks are nearly a perfect substitute for Telmex's
circuit-switched networks and will grow in competitive significance.
The Authors conclude that the WTO decision on the U.S.-Mexico
arbitration reveals a startlingly low level of economic sophistication in its
analysis of inescapably economic questions. The panel's decision runs 227
pages with 1,052 footnotes, yet it does not cite-much less rely upon-any
scholarly work on telecommunications regulation, industrial organization,
antitrust policy, international trade, or any other branch of economics.
Instead, the panel's reasoning is overwhelmingly lexical, interpreting
critical terms such as "cost" and "market power" by resorting to
dictionaries and canons of construction rather than antitrust economics. The
method is reminiscent of how United States courts approached antitrust
cases in the first half of the twentieth century. Given the high level of
economic sophistication that is now standard in competition law and
sector-specific regulation throughout the world, the WTO has made an
unimpressive start in implementing the GATS arbitration process.
II. THE U.S.-MEXICO ARBITRATION DECISION
The United States alleged that Mexico violated its commitments
under the GATS by failing to ensure that Telmex provided interconnection
to U.S. telecommunications suppliers at "cost-oriented" rates and refrained
from engaging in anticompetitive practices. The United States also alleged
that Mexico neglected to provide U.S. telecommunications suppliers
"reasonable and non-disciminatory" access to public telecommunications
networks and services as mandated by the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications. The panel found that, with respect to supply of
services on a "facilities basis," Mexico had not met its GATS
commitments.
A. The Mexican Regulatory Regime
Before 1997, Telmex supplied Mexico's long-distance and
international telecommunications services on a monopoly basis. Thereafter,
Mexico allowed multiple Mexican carriers to provide cross-border
telecommunications services over Mexican networks. At the time of the
arbitration, twenty-seven carriers provided long-distance services in
Mexico, of which eleven were "international gateway operators," which are
long-distance service licensees authorized by Cofetel to operate a switching
exchange as an international gateway. Telmex remains the country's largest
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
supplier of basic telecommunications services, including international
outbound traffic.
Cofetel regulates agreements for interconnection of public
telecommunications networks with foreign networks through its
International Long-Distance Rules ("ILD Rules").4 The ILD Rules
required, among other things, that all international gateway operators apply
the same "uniform settlement rate" to each international long-distance call,
regardless of which operator directs the call.' The Mexican operator with
the greatest market share of outgoing long-distance calls for each country
was given the power to unilaterally negotiate the settlement rate with that
country.' Furthermore, the ILD Rules' "proportionate return" provision
mandated that incoming calls from a foreign country be distributed among
Mexican operators in proportion to each operator's share of outgoing calls
to that country.7
B. The United States' Contentions
As part of the GATS negotiations in 1996 and 1997, almost all of the
signatory countries committed to abide by a set of procompetitive
regulatory principles concerning their telecommunications industries.
These principles are embodied in the WTO's Reference Paper, to which the
United States and Mexico both subscribed.8 Section 2 of the Reference
Paper, labeled "Interconnection," requires that interconnection with a
"major supplier" of public telecommunications transport networks or
services be ensured "in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions ... and cost-
4. Reglas para Prestar el Servicio de Larga Distancia Internacional que deberin aplicar
los Concesionarios de Redes Pdiblicas de Telecomunicaciones Autorizados para Prestar este
Servicio, Acuerdo que establece redes pablicas de telecomunicaciones locales, (Dec. 11,
1996), available at http://www.cft.gob.mx/html/9-publica/reglas/l ldic96.html [hereinafter
ILD Rules].
5. ILD Rules, Regla 2:XII(a)-(b), cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at
4.
6. ILD Rules, Regla 13, cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 4.
7. ILD Rules, Reglas 2:XII, 10, 13, 16, 17 and 19, cited in WTO Dispute Panel
Report, supra note 2, at 4.
8. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, NEGOTIATING GROUP ON BASIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES REFERENCE PAPER § 2.2(b) (Apr.
24, 1996), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/telecome/te123_e.htm
[hereinafter REFERENCE PAPER], cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 144.
For an analysis of the Reference Paper and its relationship to the WTO agreement on basic
telecommunications services, see J. GREGORY SIDAK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 367-94 (1997). For a critique of the vagueness of the Reference Paper,
see CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 56-58 (2001).
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oriented rates that are transparent, [and] reasonable . . . ."I Section 1 of the
Reference Paper obligates the Mexican government to take appropriate
measures to prevent a major supplier from engaging in anticompetitive
practices. The last treaty provision relevant to the United States complaint,
Section 5 of the GATS Annex, commits Mexico to ensuring that
international basic telecommunications service suppliers are accorded
access to public and private leased telecommunications transfer networks
on "reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions."'"
The United States alleged that Mexico had violated all three sections
by failing to regulate Telmex adequately. First, Mexico allegedly breached
its obligations under Section 2 of the Reference Paper by allowing Telmex
to charge interconnection rates that substantially exceeded costs. 1 Second,
the United States claimed that Mexico violated Section 1, not only by
failing to prevent Telmex from engaging in anticompetitive practices-
including horizontal price-fixing and market-sharing agreements-but also
by requiring Telmex to do so by granting it the sole power to fix
international settlement rates and restrict supply of basic
telecommunication services. 12 Third, by allegedly failing to ensure that
United States basic telecommunications suppliers were granted access to
Mexican telecommunications networks (both public and private leased) on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, Mexico allegedly contravened its
obligations under Section 5 of the GATS Annex."
C. The Panel's Findings
Addressing each of the three GATS provisions individually, the WTO
panel concluded that, with regard to the supply of services on a facilities
basis, Mexico violated its commitments under Sections 2.2 (b) and 1.1 of
the Reference Paper, and Sections 5(a) and 5(b) of the Annex on
Telecommunications. 14
1. Mexico's Commitments under Section 2 of the Reference Paper
The panel first examined whether Section 2 of the Reference Paper
applied at all to the telecommunications services at issue. It determined that
9. REFERENCE PAPER, supra note 8, at § 2.2(b), cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report,
supra note 2, at 144.
10. GATS Annex on Telecommunications § 5(a), World Trade Organization, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/26-gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS Annex].
11. See United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. S.
12. Id. at para. 241.
13. See Id. at para. 207.
14. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 225.
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the U.S. public voice telephony, circuit-switched transmission, and
facsimile services constituted the "cross-border" supply of the services-
therefore falling within the meaning of GATS Article I: 2(a).' 5
Furthermore, pursuant to Mexico's schedule of commitments, Mexico
undertook full-national-treatment commitment for the cross-border supply
of the services at issue and full-market-access commitment for the supply
of services at issue on a facilities-basis, but not on a non-facilities-basis.
After concluding that Section 2 applied to all cross-border services at issue,
except for those on a non-facilities-basis, the panel addressed whether or
not Mexico had fulfilled its commitment to provide such services under
Section 2.2(b). 6 If Telmex constituted a "major supplier," then Mexico was
obliged to ensure that Telmex provided interconnection on "terms,
conditions . . . and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable,
having regard to economic feasibility and sufficiently unbundled...
a. Was Telmex a "Major Supplier"?
The panel first examined the definition of "major supplier" listed in
the Reference Paper and concluded that Telmex satisfied its meaning: "A
major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the
terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant
market for basic telecommunications services. ... "" The panel then
determined the "relevant market" to be the termination of the services at
issue supplied cross-border, not point-to-point international
telecommunications services. It wrote:
[W]e find no evidence that a domestic telecommunications service is
substitutable for an international one, and that an outgoing call is
considered substitutable for an incoming one.... Even if the price
difference between domestic and international interconnection would
change, such a price change would not make these differences
substitutable in the eyes of a consumer.' 9
Following the Reference Paper's language, the panel then addressed
Telmex's "ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having
regard to price and supply)."2 The panel noted that Telmex was legally
required by ILD Rule 13 to negotiate settlement rates for the entire
Mexican market for termination of the services at issue: "The long-distance
service licensee having the greatest percentage of outgoing long-distance
15. See id. at 32.
16. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 174.
17. See REFERENCE PAPER, supra note 8, § 2.2(b) (emphasis added).
18. Id. at definitions, cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 174.
19. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 176.
20. Id.
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market share for the six months prior to negotiations with a given country
shall be the licensee that is authorized to negotiate settlement rates with the
operators of said country." 1 On the basis of that rule, the panel found that
Telmex had enough market power to "materially affect the terms of
participation... *"22 In short, Telmex was a "major supplier" as defined in
the Reference Paper.
b. Were Telmex's Interconnection Rates "Cost-Oriented"?
The panel then addressed whether Telmex's interconnection rates
were "cost-oriented," which the panel construed to mean "brought into a
defined relation to known costs or cost principles."23 Citing the U.S.
government's written submission, the panel ruled that Mexican law
requires the use of long-run average incremental cost ("LRAIC") as a basis
for such analysis. 4 The panel concluded that the term "cost-oriented"
means "the costs incurred in supplying the service, and that the use of long
term incremental cost methodologies, such as those required in Mexican
law, is consistent with this meaning. '"25
In deciding whether Mexico had ensured that Telmex was
interconnecting U.S. suppliers of the services at issue at cost-oriented rates,
the panel considered different types of evidence that the United States
offered. Basing its analysis on measures such as existing "grey market"
prices and the aggregate cost of relevant network components used to
interconnect U.S. suppliers, the panel concluded that the interconnection
rates charged by Telmex to U.S. suppliers were not "cost-oriented." 6
In addition to these considerations, the panel examined ILD Rules 16
and 17, which allow international gateway operators to negotiate financial
compensation agreements among themselves instead of having to
physically transfer calls when the operators do not receive traffic at their
gateways in proportion to outgoing calls.27 Because they suggested the
existence of a surplus beyond the costs of receiving calls, the financial
compensation agreements in place as part of the "proportionate allocation"
rules also contributed to the panel's decision. 8
Having determined that Telmex was a "major supplier," whose
21. ILD Rules, Regla 13, translated by Authors, also cited in WTO Dispute Panel
Report, supra note 2, at 4.
22. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 176.
23. Id. at 179 (emphasis omitted).
24. Id. at 177.
25. Id. at 181.
26. Id. at 189.
27. ILD Rules 16, 17, cited in WT7O Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 187-88.
28. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 188.
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interconnection was not implemented at "cost-oriented rates," the panel
concluded that Mexico had failed to meet its commitments under Section
2.2(b) of the Reference Paper.
2. Mexico's Commitments under Section 1 of the Reference Paper
Next, the panel addressed Mexico's commitments under Section 1.1
of the Reference Paper, which states that "[a]ppropriate measures shall be
maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together,
are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive
practices. '29 The panel referred to the definition of "anti-competitive
practices" set forth in the Reference Paper, which states that such practices
include, among other things, "engaging in anti-competitive cross-
subsidization."3 The panel concluded that, because the list was not
exhaustive, the term also includes horizontal price-fixing and market-
sharing agreements by suppliers.31
To determine the status of Mexico's practices within this meaning, the
panel examined the ILD Rules. First, the panel noted that the ILD Rules (1)
require all international gateway operators in Mexico to apply a "uniform
settlement rate" to all incoming and outgoing traffic, and (2) grant the
operator with the greatest share of outgoing calls to a particular country the
sole power to negotiate settlement rates with that country.32 The panel
believed that the effect of this process was that "Telmex must negotiate a
settlement rate for incoming calls with suppliers in the other markets
wishing to supply the Mexican market and apply ... that single rate to
interconnection for incoming traffic from the United States."33 The panel
agreed with the United States that this practice constituted anticompetitive
horizontal price-fixing in violation of Section 1.1: "[T]he removal of price
competition by the Mexican authorities, combined with the setting of the
uniform price by the major supplier, has effects tantamount to those of a
price-fixing cartel."34
Second, the decision addressed the ILD Rules' "proportionate return"
system which requires international gateway operators (1) to distribute
among themselves incoming calls from a country in proportion to the
outgoing calls that the operator sends to that country, and (2) to negotiate
29. REFERENCE PAPER, supra note 4, § 1. 1, cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra
note 2, at 191.
30. REFERENCE PAPER, supra note 4, § 1.2, cited in WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra
note 2, at 193.
31. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 193.
32. Id. at 196-98.
33. Id. at 198.
34. Id. at 199.
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financial compensation agreements among themselves that replicate
proportionality if calls are not distributed accordingly." The panel found
that this provision also violated Section 1.1 because it limited rivalry and
competition among competing suppliers and was therefore anticompetitive:
"[T]he allocation of market share between Mexican suppliers imposed by
the Mexican authorities, combined with the authorization of Mexican
operators to negotiate financial compensation between them instead of
physically transferring surplus traffic, has effects tantamount to those of a
market sharing arrangement between suppliers. '"36
Furthermore, the panel found, by requiring these anticompetitive
practices by law, Mexico had failed to maintain "appropriate measures" to
prevent such anticompetitive practices.37 Consequently, because Mexico
neglected to undertake "appropriate measures" to prevent Telmex, a "major
supplier," from engaging in anticompetitive practices, Mexico was found to
have violated its Section 1.1 obligations.38
3. Mexico's Commitments under Section 5 of the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications
Section 5(a) of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications requires
Mexico to ensure that "any service supplier of any other Member is
accorded access to and use of public telecommunication transport
networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and
conditions.... ."" The panel found that the Annex applies on a facilities
basis to basic telecommunications commitments scheduled by Mexico, as it
would be unreasonable to suppose otherwise. The panel qualified this
determination, however, by finding that Mexico's Schedule of Specific
Commitments and routing requirement failed to grant market access for the
cross-border supply of services on a non-facilities-basis-services provided
over capacity leased by the service supplier.4n
In determining whether Telmex had provided leased access to
networks and services to U.S. suppliers on "reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms and conditions," the panel first examined the rates that
Telmex charged.41 Based on the previous determination that the uniform
rates charged to interconnect U.S. suppliers exceeded cost-oriented rates by
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 78.
38. Id. at 200.
39. GATS Annex, supra note 10, § 5(a).
40. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 205.
41. GATS Annex, supra note 10, § 5(a).
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a substantial margin and precluded price competition, the panel concluded
that such rates were inconsistent with the provision of access to and use of
public telecommunications transfer networks and services on reasonable
terms.42
Consequently, with respect to ensuring access on a facilities basis to
U.S. suppliers, the panel found that Mexico failed to abide by its
commitments under Section 5(a) of the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications.43 The panel also held that Mexico failed to meet its
Section 5(b) obligations by neglecting to ensure that commercially present
U.S. suppliers had access to and use of private leased circuits and
interconnection.44
D. Summary
In considering each of the three GATS issues presented by the United
States, the WTO panel ruled against Mexico. It concluded that Mexico
failed to ensure that Telmex, a "major supplier" as defined in the Reference
Paper, was providing service at "cost-oriented" rates and avoiding
anticompetitive practices such as horizontal price-fixing and market
sharing. The panel determined that Mexico's failure in these respects
violated its obligations under Sections 2.2 and 1.1 of the Reference Paper.
Furthermore, because the panel found that Telmex did not provide the
cross-border services at issue on "reasonable and non-discriminatory"
terms to U.S. suppliers, the panel concluded that Mexico also violated
Sections 5(a) and 5(b) of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications.
III. WHAT EXPLAINS MEXICO'S INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
RATES?
One week after the U.S. government filed its brief with the WTO
attacking Mexico's international settlement rates, the FCC stated that "[t]he
current international settlement rate system was developed as part of a
tradition in which international telecommunications services were supplied
through a bilateral correspondent relationship between national monopoly
carriers."4 5 According to the FCC, the approach of the United States to
international settlement rates dates from "the 1930s and has its genesis in
42. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 200-16.
43. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2, at 214.
44. WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 2 at 216.
45. International Settlements Policy Reform, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, IB Dkt.
No. 02-324, para. I n.2 (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DA-02-2618A 1.pdf [hereinafter International Settlements Policy NPRM].
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the principles of antitrust law."46 Unlike the elaborate provisions contained
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for the setting of interconnection
prices through hundreds of arbitration proceedings run by the state public
utilities commissions throughout the United States, the FCC explained that
"[h]istorically, the market for international services has been characterized
by the model of national monopoly carriers corresponding with one
another."47 In what follows, the Authors critique the economic reasoning
that underlies the United States complaint and explain why reductions in
the international settlement rate are not producing lower international long-
distance prices for U.S. consumers.
Specifically, the United States complaint contained serious economic
flaws, which the WTO either ignored or did not perceive. For example, the
U.S. government's estimate of the costs of terminating a call in Mexico
ignored non-traffic sensitive costs that Telmex cannot recoup through other
charges. It also failed to account for regional variation in costs that Telmex
incurs in providing network access, and incorrectly relied on LRAIC as the
price that a competitive market would establish. In this Section, the
Authors address those and other errors in the U.S. government's arguments
to the WTO.
A. Non-Traffic Sensitive Costs that Telmex Incurs in Providing
Network Access
The Mexican government has a social policy of universal access,
geographically averaged prices, and minimum service quality standards for
telecommunications services. That policy implies, for Telmex, a particular
capacity requirement for its network, as well as an "obligation to serve"48
all customers as the "carrier of last resort."49 Unlike its competitors, who
bear no such obligation, Telmex may not raise prices (or offer particular
customers inferior service quality) to ration limited capacity on its network
when faced with excess demand. Nor may Telmex limit its output by
restraining the capacity of its network. The universal service mandate
compels Telmex to supply a level of network capacity that at least equals-
and most likely exceeds-the level of network capacity that would be
supplied by firms in a perfectly competitive market.5" Telmex must
46. Id. at para. 2.
47. Id.
48. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F.. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 119 (1997).
49. Id. at 513.
50. Id. ("Mandating that the incumbent [local exchange carrier] alone act as the carrier of
last resort forces the firm to hold capacity in reserve to meet demand at peak load.").
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therefore build its network with "reserve" or "standby" capacity that will
accommodate peak demand.
To provide customers the option of calling someone on any given day
at any given telephone number in Mexico, Telmex must incur certain
costs-known in U.S. telecommunications jargon as "non-traffic-sensitive
(or NTS) costs"-that do not vary with the quantity of calls (minutes of
use) that Telmex ultimately carries that day. In 2001, the European
Commission embraced the proposition that, in a regulated network
industry, capacity costs are not attributable to a specific service, but rather
constitute common fixed costs of the network as a whole.5
Telmex is implicitly required to offer consumers two valuable
services simultaneously: network access and network usage. Even
consumers outside Mexico benefit from these service offerings. Even if a
caller in the United States makes no calls to Mexico on a given day, he will
nonetheless have enjoyed the option to do so. 52 Long-run average
incremental cost by definition does not include such common or sunk costs.
Therefore, an interconnection settlement rate that is set equal to LRAIC
would be insufficient to recover the total costs an incumbent network
operator legitimately incurs in order to discharge its obligation to serve the
public.
Telmex's investment in network infrastructure necessary to perform
its obligation to serve in Mexico has the incidental effect-the network
effect-of ensuring callers in the United States the option to use Telmex's
network whenever they wish. The obligation to serve includes an obligation
to provide network access to three groups of cities and regions at three
different, geographically-averaged prices. The option value of network
access is a clear benefit to consumers, and thus its costs deserve to be
recovered. As a matter of social policy, the Mexican government decided to
use the international settlement rate as a means to recover the NTS network
costs. Nothing in the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications
Services53 or in the Reference Paper remotely suggests that signatories
51. Commission Decision 2001/354/EC, art. 82, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 30 (citing WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 108 (1994)).
52. 'There are costs associated with providing both connections and standby capacity to
supply the option to achieve a connection. The costs of standby capacity are capital costs of
network capacity that are similar to the merchant's cost of holding inventory to provide
'immediacy' to customers." J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law
and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 327, 362 (1997). See also William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the
Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY 383 (2002).
53. Data on Telecommunications Markets Covered by the WTO Negotiations on Basic
Telecommunications (Feb. 17, 1997), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres97_e/
data3.htm (unofficial briefing document).
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surrender their discretion to permit carriers the opportunity to recover NTS
costs through the international settlement rate.
B. Regional Variation in Costs that Telmex Incurs in Providing
Network Access
Mexico has three tiers of international settlement rates that vary by
city or larger geographic area. The international settlement rate for smaller
cities and remote regions is higher than for Mexico City, Guadalajara, and
Monterrey. Because there are economies of scale and density in
telecommunications networks, the differential pricing reflects the greater
cost that Telmex incurs in providing network access to smaller cities and
remote regions. In addition, the differential pricing reflects the greater
value (the network effect) that is enjoyed by callers to Mexico as Telmex
extends the public switched telephone network to provide access to a larger
share of the population. Service to these smaller cities and outlying areas is
at the heart of Mexico's national policy to provide universal service.
Currently, however, there is no universal service fund ("USF") in Mexico.
The only source of funding for achieving universal service is the revenue
earned by Telmex, which alone bears an obligation and duty to serve as the
carrier of last resort.
C. Would a Competitive Market-Set Price Equal to Long-Run
Average Incremental Cost?
In its endorsement of LRAIC as the best measure of an operator's
cost, the U.S. government failed to mention that the WTO
Telecommunications Agreement never endorsed LRAIC.54 Nor did the U.S.
government mention that the definition of cost can reasonably rest on other
economic principles. In a multi-product firm, which by definition has some
economies of scope, price must deviate from LRAIC. Otherwise, the firm
would not be able to meet its revenue requirement and new capital
investment would not occur. The U.S. government's vision of cost-based
pricing would not allow Telmex an opportunity to recover its total
operating costs plus a non-monopolistic return on its invested capital in the
network.
54. See REFERENCE PAPER, supra note 8, at § 2.2(b). The Reference Paper states that
interconnection is to be ensured "in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including
technical standards and specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent,
reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the
supplier need not pay for network components or facilities that it does not require for the
service to be provided." Id. (emphasis added).
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The U.S. government mischaracterized Mexican telecommunications
law as requiring international settlement rates to be based on LRAIC. The
United States made the following claim concerning domestic
interconnection rates in Mexico:
Mexican law requires interconnection rates to reflect "long-run average
incremental costs," in line with the general principle that
interconnection rates must relate to the cost of providing that service.
Reflecting its domestic requirements, Mexico explained to the WTO
Negotiating Group on Telecommunications in February 1995 that
interconnection charges must be determined on the basis of the true
costs of the service provider .... Since that time, the Mexican
government has underscored on several occasions that Mexico requires
interconnection rates to be based in cost, reflecting the cost an efficient
enterprise would incur in providing interconnection. 55
Although it claimed that Article 63 of Mexico's 1995 Federal Law
explicitly "requires" that domestic interconnection rates reflect LRAIC, the
U.S. government's own citation demonstrated that such a requirement is
neither explicit nor implied. The law states that the Secretary is
"authorized" to apply domestic interconnection rates on a carrier with
significant market power that allows recovery "at least, of the long-run
average incremental cost.''56 Next, the U.S. government asserted that
domestic interconnection rates "are meant to allow the supplier to recover
long term total incremental costs as well as imputable common costs. 57
Neither passage supports the U.S. government's economic misconception
that domestic interconnection rates in Mexico must be set according to
LRAIC. Indeed, the cited materials do just the opposite.
The U.S. government also cited the Vienna Convention in support of
its LRAIC approach:
In sum, there appears to be consensus among many WTO Members -
including Mexico - that interconnection rates should be based on the
cost of providing interconnection. In other words, it appears that WTO
Members intended to give the term "cost-oriented" and "basadas en
costos" this "special meaning." Therefore, in accordance with
generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation reflected in
Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention, the Panel should interpret the
term basadas en costos on this basis.58
This passage is another misstatement of then-current economic policy.
The U.S. government asserted that other WTO members consider "cost-
55. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 110.
56. "Ley Federal De Telecommunicaciones", [Federal Law on Telecommunications],
D.O., 22 dejunio de 1995.
57. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 110 n.97
(emphasis added).
58. Id. atpara. 113.
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based" to mean based on LRAIC, and included the United States and
Mexico in this list, even though the United States has retreated from this
position and Mexico specifically enumerates other factors that should be
considered in setting domestic interconnection rates.
In short, the U.S. government failed to prove that domestic
interconnection rates in Mexico are set at LRAIC. Consequently, even if
one were to counterfactually assume that international settlement rates and
domestic interconnection rates are set in the same manner, it still does not
follow that the charge for terminating a call from the United States to
Mexico should be set at LRAIC. 59
D. The Cross-Subsidization Policy Chosen by the Mexican
Government
Prices on international calls to the United States from Mexico are
used to subsidize the cost of supplying local telephone service in Mexico.
The price of local telephone service, which is approximately $14 United
States dollars ("USD") per month, is capped below the LRAIC of
providing such service. The first 100 local calls are included in the monthly
rate. Local calls thereafter are charged on an incremental (per call) basis.
There is no per-minute charge for local calls. A "subscriber" who pays
nothing to Telmex still maintains the ability to receive unlimited incoming
calls. In this respect, Telmex subsidizes access to the network through the
pricing of other services. This cross-subsidization policy of the Mexican
government accepts the tradeoff between faster network deployment and
increased long-distance calling.
In addition to this cross-subsidization policy, other domestic
regulatory factors may keep long-distance prices artificially high in
Mexico. A wireless carrier must contract with an affiliate to offer
international long-distance service. That arrangement creates a classic
"double-marginalization" problem. The long-distance price faced by
wireless customers is marked up twice-once by the affiliated long-
distance provider and a second time by the wireless provider. Economists
have recognized the price-decreasing effect of this double-marginalization
for decades.'
59. Humpty Dumpty said, "When I use a word ... it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less." LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (& WHAT
ALICE FOUND THERE) chapter 6 (1871). The United States has similarly taken the position in
international negotiations on telecommunications services that LRAIC means whatever the
U.S. Trade Representative chooses it to mean. See generally Rohlfs & Sidak, supra note 3
(discussing the United States' interpretation of the 1997 WTO Agreement on
telecommunications services).
60. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
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In seeking Mexico's rapid elimination of its cross-subsidy policy, the
U.S. government ignores its own lengthy transition to cost-based pricing.
Before the introduction of competition in most countries,
telecommunications prices have typically embodied large cross-subsidies
that reflect public policy preferences.6' In particular, access to the network
for residential customers has generally been priced below cost. The
preponderance of network costs have been recovered through high usage
rates for domestic and international long-distance calling. As noted earlier,
the economic rationale for these regulatory policies was to promote
universal service-and thereby to harness the positive network
externalities, or "bandwagon effects," from increasing the reach of the
telecommunications network.62 Mexico is no different from the United
States in this respect. As late as 1999, the FCC delayed implementation of
full-rate rebalancing in the Coalition for Affordable Local and Long
Distance Service ("CALLS") proposal.63 Fifteen years after the AT&T
divestiture, the FCC was still concerned about too rapid of a transition to
cost-oriented rates.
In Mexico, regulators have yet to adopt explicit markups above cost-
ORGANIZATION 398-401 (Addison Wesley 3d ed. 2000); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174 (1988); and Joseph Spengler, Vertical Integration and
Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347, 351-52 (1950) for a contemporary exposition of this
topic. Double-marginalization occurs when two companies have a vertical supplier-
customer relationship. The upstream company sets its price, and thus its margin between
price and marginal cost, to maximize its own profits. The downstream company likewise
sets its price and margin to maximize its profit, treating what it pays the upstream company
as a cost. If the upstream company begins to offer the downstream product also, it generally
will set the final price of the downstream product to maximize its profits jointly from both
the upstream and downstream products. The company offering the combined product will
often find that it can increase its profits by lowering the price of the final product below the
price that would be set in the previous situation. The company offering the combined
product will take into account how a lower price on the final product will increase the sale
of and profits from the upstream product, while a company offering only the final product
will not.
Although the analysis of double-marginalization originally was derived for the case
of monopoly, it also applies to imperfect competition, which characterizes
telecommunications markets because of the large fixed and common costs. The leading
United States antitrust treatise, for example, observes that "[t]he double-marginalization
model appears to make robust predictions that vertical integration results in increased output
and lower prices any time the affected markets are something less than perfectly
competitive." PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 30 (2d ed.
2002).
61. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL
SERVICE? WHEN TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES BECOME TRANSPARENT 166 (2000) (discussing
regulatory requirements to price local exchange service below cost).
62. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIES 177-79 (2001).
63. See Access Charge Reform, Sixth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,962 (2000).
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oriented domestic interconnection rates. Mexico still does not have a
universal service funding mechanism. Such measures, if adopted, would
ease Mexico's transition to a fully rebalanced rate structure. Without such
measures, however, Mexico would be called upon to complete, in only a
few years, what the United States has failed to complete in nearly nineteen
years. The U.S. government can insist, upon threat of trade sanctions, that
Mexico make this transition immediately, but truculence carries no
assurance that it will accomplish what U.S. policy-makers have been
unable to do at home.
IV. Do U.S. LONG-DISTANCE CARRIERS PASS REDUCTIONS IN
MEXICO'S INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT RATE ON TO THEIR
U.S. CUSTOMERS?
The FCC said in October 2002 that its "primary goal underlying [its]
policies [on international settlement rates] has been and continues to be the
protection of U.S. consumers from Iotential harm caused by instances of
insufficient competition in the global telecommunications market."' The
FCC had previously said that through its policies on international settlement
rates it seeks, among other things, "to prevent anticompetitive conduct in the
provision of international services."6 5 The U.S. government's complaint
was not consistent with this statement of the FCC's policy. Its premise that
the international settlement rate is the principal cause of high southbound
long-distance prices entirely ignored the more powerful explanatory factor:
the absence of vigorous price competition among U.S. long-distance
carriers.
A. Tacit Collusion and the Price of Southbound Long-Distance
Services
With respect to the price of southbound calls, the U.S. government's
complaint was knocking on the wrong door. This issue raised competition
law questions in the United States. Stated differently, the price of
southbound long-distance services in the United States depends primarily
on the level of competition among U.S. long-distance carriers, which is
beyond the scope of the WTO but squarely within the purview of the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice. Curiously,
the U.S. government acknowledged this relationship in its submission:
Elasticity of demand is more difficult to estimate for termination of
cross-border services, because demand for cross-border services by end
64. International Settlements Policy NPRM, supra note 45, at para. I (emphasis added).
65. Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3873, 3877 para. 6 (1995).
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users in the United States is not directly related to the settlement rates
charged by Telmex and other Mexican carriers but rather to the retail
prices charged by the U.S. carriers to their customers.
66
If demand for southbound traffic is first and foremost a function of long-
distance prices, then it was circuitous and incomplete for the U.S.
government to focus on the international settlement rate and ignore the
margin between that rate and the retail price.
Since 1995, the U.S. government has ignored empirical evidence that
the margins on outbound international long-distance traffic have increased
over time despite the decrease in concentration among long-distance
service providers-a counterintuitive relationship that implies that U.S.
long-distance carriers have been pricing in a tacitly or explicitly collusive
manner. 67 Using data from Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Japan,
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, Paul MacAvoy
determined that international price-cost margins (defined as the ratio of the
price-cost margin to price) were inversely related to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ("HHI") measure 'of market concentration for 1994.68
Professor MacAvoy concluded that, because of the "insignificance of
concentration changes, we must reject the hypothesis that international




The trend in higher margins for outbound international calls in the
face of declining international settlement rates continued through 2001.
Table 1 shows the relationship between the international settlement rate to
Mexico and the margins earned by U.S. long-distance carriers on
southbound calls to Mexico from 1992 to 2001.
66. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at attachment A para.
6 (Oct. 3, 2002).
67. See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO
ESTABLISH COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 157 (1996). An earlier
study conducted by Professor MacAvoy found that the regulatory environment since the
AT&T divestiture led to market sharing among the three biggest interexchange carriers
rather than price competition. See Paul W. MacAvoy, Tacit Collusion under Regulation in
the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
147 (1995). See also PAUL W. MACAVOY & MICHAEL A. WILLIAMS, DEREGULATION OF
ENTRY IN LONG-DISTANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2002); Paul W. MacAvoy, Testing for
Competitiveness of Markets for Long Distance Telephone Services: Competition Finally?,
13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295 (1998).
68. PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH
COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 168 (1996). The HHI is the sum of
the squares of the individual market shares of all market participants. The higher the HHI,
the greater the market concentration. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 60, at 247.
69. Id. at 169.
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TABLE I
CALLS FROM THE U.S. TO MEXICO: INTERNATIONAL SETITLEMENT
RATES, LONG-DISTANCE PRICES CHARGED BY U.S. CARRIERS, U.S.
CARRIER MARGINS, AND HHI, 1989-2001
Year Int'l Long- U.S. U.S. HHI***
Settlement Distance Carrier Carrier
Rate Price Margins Markups
($ per ($ per ($ per Over Costs
minute)* minute)** minute) (B - A)/A
A B B-A
1992 $0.890 $1.186 $0.296 33.3% 5852.0
1993 $0.824 $1.212 $0.389 47.2% 5484.7
1994 $0.684 $1.103 $0.419 61.2% 5271.0
1995 $0.610 $0.972 $0.362 59.4% 5072.0
1996 $0.540 $0.827 $0.287 53.2% 5205.2
1997 $0.432 $0.732 $0.300 69.4% 4336.6
1998 $0.399 $0.641 $0.242 60.8% 4038.1
1999 $0.199 $0.525 $0.325 163.2% 4162.3
2000 $0.196 $0.462 $0.266 135.3% 6214.8
2001 $0.190 NA NA NA NA
Sources: *FCC, IMTS ACCOUNTING RATES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1985-2004
(July 1, 2004), at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/artsweb.xis;
**Linda Blake & Jim Lande, FCC COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, Trends in the
International Telecommunications Industry Table. 9 (Apr. 2001), at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/Intl/
itmd00.pdf;
*** Linda Blake & Jim Lande, FCC COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, International
Telecommunications Data, (1992-2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/intl.html.
Note: The FCC estimates average international long-distance prices by dividing
U.S. carriers' total billed revenues for calls to Mexico by U.S. carriers' total billed
minutes for calls to Mexico. Unlike the raw FCC pricing data, our prices are in
constant 2001 USD.
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Table 1 shows that the international settlement rates charged to U.S.
long-distance carriers by Mexican operators declined by 91 percent in real
terms from 1990 to 2002-from $1.04 (USD) per minute to $0.09 (USD)
per minute. However, competition among U.S. long-distance carriers did
not drive down the retail price of southbound long-distance service as
rapidly. As a result, U.S. carriers enjoyed a substantial increase in operating
margins over the same period. In 1990, U.S. carriers earned margins of 16
percent for carrying a call to Mexico. By 1999, that margin had increased
to 163 percent. The equivalent margin earned for the period by U.S.
carriers for calls to Canada was roughly 40 percent.
70
As explained by Professor MacAvoy, the decline in concentration in
long-distance markets over the 1990s should have been met with reductions
in operating margins, had United States carriers been acting in a non-
cooperative manner. But the empirical evidence suggests that the opposite
occurred. Figure 1 shows the relationship between margins earned by U.S.
carriers on the U.S.-to-Mexico route and the HHI on the same route.
70. In 1999, the settlement rate for calls completed in Canada was $0.20 (USD) per
minute, and the average revenue per minute for U.S. carriers on the United States-to-Canada
route was $0.28 (USD). FCC, IMTS ACCOUNTING RATES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1985-2004
(July 1, 2004) at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/artsweb.xls [hereinafter IMTS ACCOUNTING
RATES]. See also LINDA BLAKE & JIM LANDE, FCC COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, 1999
International Telecommunications Data Table A.] (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/Intl/4361 -f99.pdf.
[hereinafter FCC 1999 International Data].
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FIGURE 1
MARKUP EARNED BY U.S. LONG-DISTANCE CARRIERS



















Note: The markup is the per-minute margin relative to the per-minute international
settlement rate.
Figure 1 shows that while the HHI declined from 5,852 to 4,162
between 1992 and 1999, the margin earned by U.S. carriers on the
southbound route to Mexico increased from roughly 33 percent to 160
percent over the same period. This evidence is not consistent with the
hypothesis that U.S. carriers are pricing in a non-cooperative manner on the
southbound route. Consequently, the empirical evidence contradicts the
claim by the U.S. government that U.S. consumers will capture the benefit
from further reductions in the international settlement rate. To the contrary,
the empirical evidence implies that the U.S. long-distance carriers keep
those reductions in the form of larger margins.
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B. In a More Competitive Environment, United States Long-
Distance Carriers Would Have Reduced Their Price for
Southbound Calls Beyond the Decrease in International
Settlement Rates
It was an article of faith in the U.S. government's complaint that, as
the FCC said in October 2002, "[rjeductions in inflated settlement rates...
move prices closer to cost."'" With respect to calls from the United States
to Mexico, however, the data show that proposition to be unequivocally
false. Although it is true that prices for calls from the United States to
Mexico declined significantly from 1989 to 2002, the margins that U.S.
long-distance carriers earned remained high. In a competitive environment
with a homogenous service such as long-distance telephony, entry will
occur until price is driven to marginal cost. More precisely, in the presence
of economies of scale, price will be driven down to a level that exceeds
marginal cost only by as much as necessary to recover fixed costs. In the
process, the shares of the incumbent providers are also driven down,
leading to a decrease in concentration. Hence, if firms are not colluding,
decreases in concentration should cause decreases in margins. Contrary to
this fundamental economic relationship, the margins earned by U.S. long-
distance carriers on calls to Mexico increased over the past decade as
concentration declined.
Southbound long-distance prices would have been substantially lower
if the three largest U.S. long-distance carriers had priced more
competitively. Under Cournot competition, firms compete by choosing
quantities such that each firm's quantity choice is a best response to the
other firm's quantity. The markup relative to price under Cournot
competition is equal to the inverse of the product of the number of firms
and the own-price elasticity of demand, or
p-c 1
[1] p
where p is the price, c is the marginal cost, n is the number of firms, and E
is the own-price elasticity of demand for the service.73 Under the
monopoly-pricing rule,74 a model of perfect collusion among competitors,
the markup relative to price is equal to inverse of the own-price elasticity of
71. International Settlements Policy NPRM, supra note 45, at para. 17.
72. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 60, at 88.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 235 (W.W. Norton & Co. 3rd
ed. 1992).
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Under Bertrand competition, a third model of oligopolistic
competition, firms compete by choosing prices such that each firm's price
is a best response to the other firm's price.75 When goods are homogenous,
Bertrand competition results in prices equal to marginal costs.
Table 2 shows some scenarios from 1989 to 2002 in which the three
U.S. long-distance carriers competed according to these three familiar
pricing models in the industrial organization literature.
75. Id.
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TABLE 2
PRICING FOR CALLS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO MEXICO UNDER
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING, 1989-2001
Year Int'l Actual Predicted Predicted Predicted
Settlement Long- Long- Long- Long-
Rate Distance Distance Distance Distance
($ per Price Price Under Price Under Price
minute) ($ per Bertrand Cournot Under
A minute) Model Model Monopoly
B
1989 $1.25 $1.51 $1.25 $1.70 $6.25
1990 $1.04 $1.21 $1.04 $1.42 $5.20
1991 $0.96 $1.27 $0.96 $1.31 $4.80
1992 $0.89 $1.19 $0.89 $1.21 $4.45
1993 $0.82 $1.21 $0.82 $1.12 $4.10
1994 $0.68 $1.10 $0.68 $0.93 $3.40
1995 $0.61 $0.97 $0.61 $0.83 $3.05
1996 $0.54 $0.83 $0.54 $0.74 $2.70
1997 $0.43 $0.73 $0.43 $0.59 $2.15
1998 $0.40 $0.64 $0.40 $0.55 $2.00
1999 $0.20 $0.53 $0.20 $0.27 $1.00
2000 $0.20 $0.46 $0.20 $0.27 $1.00
2001 $0.19 NA $0.19 $0.26 $0.95
Note: Assumes an own-price elasticity of demand equal to -1.25. Prices are in
constant 2001 U.S. dollars.
As Table 2 shows, U.S. long-distance carriers appeared to compete in
a Cournot manner from 1989 to 1993-that is, the actual prices were
roughly equal to the predicted prices under Cournot competition. Indeed, as
the former Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication
Union, Dr. Pekka Tarjanne, observed, "[b]etween 1990 and 1993, at
precisely the time when significant price reductions were first being made
in US international settlement rates, the average revenue earned by US
operators per minute of outgoing international traffic actually grew."76
Hence, the actual price charged by U.S. long-distance carriers for
calls to Mexico began to deviate from the Cournot price in 1994 and began
76. Pekka Tarjanne, How Would We Recognize a Competitive Telecommunications
Market if We Saw One?, Address at the American Enterprise Institute 7 (1998), at
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/papers/competitionlaeirl .pdf.
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to move in the direction of the monopoly price by 2001. Put differently, for
the years following the WTO's 1997 agreement on telecommunications
services, the U.S. long-distance companies set prices on calls from the
United States to Mexico at a level that exceeded the predicted level by the
Cournot model of non-cooperative oligopoly pricing. The U.S. government
failed in its stated goals of protecting U.S. consumers of international
telecommunications to Mexico, and yet the United States argued that the
problem was the international settlement rate. The WTO complaint process
does not exist to permit a signatory nation to mask its own failure to protect
its own consumers from the pricing behavior of its own domestic carriers.
V. DID TELMEX HAVE MARKET POWER IN POINT-TO-POINT
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO?
On economic grounds, the U.S. government's and the WTO's market
definition-the termination of international circuit-switched calls from the
United States into Mexico-was incorrectly narrow in scope. The proper
market definition is point-to-point long-distance services between the
United States and Mexico. But even if one uses the U.S. government's
incorrect market definition, it is still doubtful that Telmex had market
power.
A. Point-to-Point International Telecommunications Services as
the Relevant Product Market
The U.S. government's allegation that Telmex possessed and
exercised market power could not be evaluated without identifying the
proper definition of both product and geographic markets. The key to the
proper market definition is to recognize that a southbound call is a
substitute for a northbound call.
1. The Relevant Product and Geographic Market
Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, used by the Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice (as well as the FCC) to define
product markets, a set of services represents a distinct product market if a
hypothetical unregulated monopoly provider of those services could
profitably sustain a nontransitory, nontrivial price increase-that is, if the
unregulated monopolist's profits after the price increase would exceed its
profits before the price increase.77 If the price increase would cause enough
77. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 6, at § 1.11 (1992) (revised 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/hmg.htm (defining the relevant product market as "a product or group of
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buyers to shift their purchases to an alternative product to render the
increase unprofitable, then that alternative product should be considered to
be part of the relevant product market.
A closed user group ("CUG") is generally defined as a group where
the members are as concerned about the price of receiving a call as the
price of making a call, such as where a group of friends and family located
in both the United States and Mexico have an interest in keeping call costs
down in general. These CUGs exist both in the private context, where a
group of friends and family does not want to impose high costs on other
members, and in the business context, where a firm has a substantial
interest in minimizing rates paid by calling parties who are clients or
potential sources of business.
The consequence of CUGs is that international callers will consider
the prices of incoming calls when choosing whether to make or receive
calls. Because a Telmex customer in Mexico can receive calls for free,
international calls made from the United States to Mexico act as a
constraint on Telmex's negotiation of the international settlement rate and
its pricing of northbound international long-distance service. This form of
substitution within a CUG is well recognized in both the economic
literature and regulatory practice."8 A consumer in Mexico can substitute
receiving an inbound international call for making an outbound
international call, provided that he has an economical way to indicate his
desire to have a telephone conversation with a party in the United States.79
Reversing a call from Mexico to the United States will result in the
Mexican carrier losing the revenue for the outgoing call, but gaining the
international settlement rate. Even if a Mexican consumer elects to call an
individual in the United States and arrange to have that individual call him
back, the pricing of calls from the United States to Mexico will discipline
Telmex's ability to raise its price.
In particular, a Mexican consumer will request a callback from the
United States if the savings from the callback (equal to the per-minute
difference between the northbound and southbound long-distance rates,
multiplied by the duration of the call) exceeds the cost of alerting the party
products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and
future seller of those products ['monopolist'] likely would impose at least a 'small but
significant and nontransitory' increase in price") [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES].
78. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, Mobile Telephone, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS: STRUCTURE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION 563, 566
(Martin E. Cave, et al. eds., 2002) (discussing a "calling party pays" framework).
79. This alternative is contingent on the consent of the receiving party in the United
States, because the receiving party has to pay the charge for the call under this alternative.
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in the United States of the Mexican consumer's interest to engage in
conversation. Consequently, for closed user groups making calls of
sufficient duration for the per-minute cost savings to exceed the alert cost,
southbound calls carried by AT&T, Sprint, and WorldCom are perfect
substitutes for northbound calls carried by Telmex.
The substitutability of southbound calls for northbound calls has been
demonstrated by the rising trend in the length of northbound calls versus
southbound calls as the price of northbound calls has fallen relative to the
price of southbound calls, as demonstrated by Figure 2.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
FIGURE 2
MARKUP EARNED BY U.S. LONG-DISTANCE CARRIERS PROVIDING
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Source: Linda Blake & Jim Lande, FCC COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, International
Telecommunications Data, (1996-2000), available at http://www.fcc.govl
Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/intl.html.
As Figure 2 shows, the average duration of a southbound call from the
United States to Mexico fell from 7.7 minutes to 6.7 minutes between 1999
and 2000.80 At the same time, the average duration of a northbound call
from Mexico to the United States rose from 4.1 minutes to 6.1 minutes.81
Thus, in one year, the ratio of the northbound to southbound call durations
rose from .53 to .91, which is near parity.
The relevant geographic market is point-to-point. At its most
fundamental level, a long-distance connection "involves a customer making
a connection from one specific location to another specific location."82 As
80. FCC 1999 International Data, supra note 70, at Table A.1; LINDA BLAKE & JIM
LANDE, FCC COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, 2000 International Telecommunications Data
Table A. 1 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/
FCC-StateLink/Intl/4361-00.pdf [hereinafter FCC 2000 International Data].
81. FCC 1999 International Data supra note 70, at Table A. 1; FCC 2000 International
Data, supra note 80, at Table A. 1.
82. Regulatory Treatment of LEC Provision of Interexchange Services Originating in
the LEC's Local Exchange Area, Second Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,756, para. 64
(1997) [hereinafter BOC Classification Order].
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the FCC has observed, customers "do not view interexchange calls
originating in different locations to be close substitutes for each other."83 In
this respect, the relevant geographic market for international long-distance
services between the United States and Mexico includes all possible routes
that permit a connection from one particular location in the United States
(Mexico) to another location in Mexico (the United States)-that is, a
point-to-point market.8 4 Refile and reorganization are not necessary to
consider because there is no third country through which calls on the
United States-Mexico routes could be more cheaply completed.
2. Telmex's Incentive to Eliminate Double-Marginalization on
Southbound Calls and the Resulting Incentive to Lower Its Price
of Northbound Calls
Because of the double-marginalization effect described earlier,
Telmex has a strong incentive to moderate its prices on the northbound
calls to the United States. The reasoning is as follows: the lower the price
that Telmex charges for a northbound call to the United States, the more
that call becomes a substitute in a closed-user group for a southbound call
from the United States to Mexico. Every southbound call is terminated by
Telmex (unless it is illegally terminated through bypass). In other words,
termination by Telmex in Mexico is a complementary input to the carriage
of a call by a U.S. long-distance carrier across the border.
As noted earlier, however, the southbound route is imperfectly
competitive, if not tacitly or explicitly collusive. Consequently, the big
three U.S. long-distance carriers have an incentive to set a retail margin in
addition to the margin inherent in the international settlement rate that
Mexico and the United States have negotiated. Telmex, however, has the
incentive to force the U.S. long-distance carriers to reduce their retail prices
on the southbound route so that consumers in the United States demand
more minutes of use, which Telmex will then terminate at the international
settlement rate. The means by which Telmex attempts to increase the
derived demand for termination in Mexico is to make the retail rate for
northbound calls to the United States more price competitive with the retail




85. Telmex's incentive to eliminate double-marginalization on the southbound route
finds a close analogy in the economic analysis of United States telecommunications
regulation. Under current regulatory policies in the United States, access and long-distance
services are both sold at prices exceeding marginal (incremental) cost, so as to cover the
large fixed costs of local and long-distance networks. Consequently, the academic literature
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
B. Did Telmex Possess Market Power in the Relevant Product and
Geographic Markets?
It is doubtful that Telmex had the ability to raise the international
settlement rate for the termination of long-distance calls that originate in
the United States because it lacked market power in the relevant product
market consisting of point-to-point combinations for international calls
between the United States and Mexico. The international settlement rate, of
course, has fallen steadily and substantially. So, in this context, market
power may be considered the refusal to drop price in the face of
competition and falling input prices.
1. Did Telmex Have Market Power in the Market for Northbound
Point-to-Point Telecommunications Services?
Although a large market share does not necessarily indicate market
power, a low market share usually indicates a lack of market power.
Usually, a firm with a low market share cannot raise the price of a product
by restricting its output.86 United States courts almost never conclude that a
firm possesses market power if its market share is less than 50 percent.8
Although Telmex' s overall share of the international
telecommunications services market exceeded 60 percent at the time of the
WTO case, the swift decline in Telmex's share since 1997 implies that
in the United States recognizes that a Bell Operating Company ("BOC") has a greater
incentive to charge lower long-distance prices in the United States than does a U.S.
Interexchange Carrier ("IXC") because the BOC's pricing decisions consider the additional
margin earned on access service when long-distance sales are expanded by lower prices.
Furthermore, when the BOC lowers the long-distance price, the IXCs will lower their prices,
which will increase the number of long-distance minutes demanded and consequently the
number of access minutes demanded from the BOCs. See DAVID E.M. SAPPINGTON &
DENNIS L. WEISMAN, DESIGNING INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY 258-61, 267-71 (1996). See also David S. Sibley & Dennis L. Weisman, The
Competitive Incentives of Vertically Integrated Local Exchange Carriers: An Economic and
Policy Analysis, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 74 (1998); Dennis L. Weisman, Regulation
and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance,
8 J. REG. ECON. 249 (1995).
86. See, e.g., BOC Classification Order, supra note 82, at para. 83 (possessing the
ability to raise prices by restricting one's own output "usually requires a large market
share"). "[T]he fact that each BOC interLATA affiliate initially will have zero market share
in the provision of in-region, interstate, domestic, interLATA services suggests that the
affiliate will not initially be able to raise price by restricting its output." Id. at para. 96.
87. See Joseph Angland, et al., Antitrust Law Developments, I A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST
L. 213-14 (4th ed. 1997) (summarizing case law). See also United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) ("it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four
percent [market share] would be enough [to constitute a monopoly]; and certainly thirty-
three percent is not"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 952-68 (1981) (surveying case law).
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Telmex lacked market power. Figure 3 shows the rate of decline in
Telmex's share from January 1997 to January 2002.
FIGURE 3
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Source: TELMEX, PARTICIPATION DE MERCADO DE LARGA DISTANCIA POR
SERVICIO: TOTAL (on file with Authors).
As Figure 3 shows, Telmex's share of revenue from outbound
international long-distance service decreased from 98.3 percent in January
1997 to 64.6 percent in January 2002. As a benchmark for comparison,
when the FCC declared in 1995 that AT&T was non-dominant in
"interstate, domestic, interexchange telecommunications services" in the
United States, AT&T's market share was estimated to be 60 percent.88 By
that time, eleven years had passed since the U.S. government's breakup of
the Bell System. Likewise, in 1996, AT&T's overall share of the
international long-distance services market was estimated to be about 60
percent when the FCC declared AT&T to be non-dominant in those
services.89 On outbound routes to a number of countries, AT&T's market
88. Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3271, 3307 para. 68 (1995) ("Although several parties argue that AT&T's overall
market share of 60 percent is inconsistent with a finding that AT&T lacks market power, we
disagree.") [hereinafter AT&T Motion 1].
89. Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Declared Non-Dominant for International Service,
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,963, paras. 38-40 (1996).
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share was significantly higher. AT&T's average market share (weighted by
revenues) on routes to seventy-six select countries was 74 percent, and the
carrier faced no competition whatsoever on routes to four countries.9"
2. The Demand for Southbound Calls into Mexico Is Price Elastic,
which Reduced the Likelihood that Telmex Could Have
Exercised Market Power in the Determination of International
Settlement Rates
The U.S. government asserted that Telmex had market power in the
termination of long-distance calls that originate in the U.S. because the
United States demand for southbound calls is not sensitive to changes in
prices.9' The available evidence on the relationship between the volume of
U.S. southbound traffic and southbound long-distance prices (as opposed to
international settlement rates) appears to contradict that assertion. Table 3
shows the degree to which demand for southbound traffic has fluctuated in
response to changes in the price of southbound calls from 1996 through
2000.
TABLE 3
OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR SOUTHBOUND CALLS INTO
MEXICO, 1996-2000
Year Quantity of Percentage Long- Percentage Own-Price
Minutes Increase Distance Decrease in Elasticity
(thousands) in Quantity Price Long- of Demand
of Minutes ($ per Distance (A / B)
(A) minute) Prices (B)
1996 2,380,007 $0.827
1997 2,786,488 17.0% $0.732 -11.5 % -1.48
1998 3,020,570 8.4 % $0.641 -12.4 % -0.68
1999 4,053,381 34.2% $0.525 -18.1 % -1.89
2000 6,801,152 67.8 % $0.462 -12.0% -5.65
Average 
-2.42
Source: Linda Blake & Jim Lande, FCC COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, International
Telecommunications Data, (1996-2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/intl.html.
Note: Prices are in constant 2001USD.
As Table 3 shows, assuming that a price decrease is the only factor
that influences the demand for southbound service, the average own-price
elasticity of demand from 1997 through 2000 was 2.42 in absolute terms,
90. Id.
91. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, attachment A para. 6
(suggesting "that demand for additional minutes to Mexico from the United States in
response to settlement reductions has also been somewhat inelastic").
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which is considered highly elastic.9" If half of the growth in southbound
traffic was attributable to other factors, such as growth in income or growth
in population, then the elasticity estimate would be 1.21 in absolute terms.
Even this own-price elasticity of demand (greater than one in absolute
terms) implies that Telmex could not raise termination rates (an input to the
end-user's price of service) excessively without losing a substantial amount
of southbound calls.
To generate a smaller estimate of the own-price elasticity of demand
to support its case, the U.S. government relied on a specious economic
methodology. It related the change in southbound traffic to the change in
international settlement rates:
During the longer period from 1998 through 2001, when the settlement
rate between the United States and Mexico fell from 37 cents to 15.5
cents per minute, a decrease of 58.1%, overall incoming minutes
received by Mexican carriers increased 71%. Adjusting this volume
increase for the increase in volume of minutes that likely would have
taken place over this period in any case due to extraneous economic
factors, based on evidence of the annual growth in United States-
Mexico traffic of 8.4% from 1997-1998 when there was no decrease in
the settlement rate, the total price-related change in volume over this
period can be estimated at 46.5%, yielding an elasticity of 0.8.
The U.S. government attributed 100 percent of the growth in
southbound traffic in 1998 to non-price-related factors because the
international settlement rate did not change that year.94 Although the
international settlement rate did not change, the price paid by consumers in
the United States certainly did change: Table 3 shows that southbound
long-distance prices decreased by 12.4 percent in 1998. If the U.S.
government had attributed a lower (and more reasonable) percentage of the
growth in southbound traffic to non-price-related factors, then it would
have derived a much higher estimate of the own-price elasticity of demand
for southbound traffic. Because of this error in analysis, the U.S.
government's estimate of the own-price elasticity of demand on the
southbound route was false.
92. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIc THEORY 300 (1990).
93. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, attachment A para. 6
(citations omitted).
94. Id. In the U.S. government's model, there are only two variables that can explain a
change in the volume of southbound traffic: the international settlement rate and extraneous
economic factors. Because the international settlement rate did not change, the U.S.
government incorrectly infers that the change in southbound traffic was due entirely to
exogenous factors. In fact, the change was likely due to the real price for service faced by
U.S. customers as reflected in the international rate charged by U.S. long distance carriers.
Id.
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3. The Supply of Northbound International Telecommunications
Services by Rival Networks Is also Price Elastic, which Implies
that Telmex Could Not Have Imposed Excessive Access
Charges
The price elasticity of supply for northbound international calls is an
important determinant of whether Telmex has the ability to exercise market
power in the relevant product and geographic markets. The FCC assesses
supply elasticity based on two main factors: (1) the capacity of existing
competitors to expand supply and (2) low entry barriers for new suppliers.95
The FCC's telecommunications regulations obviously do not bind Mexico.
But even if one adopts the approach used in the United States to measure
supply elasticity with respect to telecommunications carriers, one must
conclude that the supply of northbound international telecommunications
services is price-elastic.
Telmex's competitors could absorb immediately, and without
additional investment, significant numbers of Telmex's long-distance
customers. As Table 4 shows, there are numerous providers of competitive
long-distance services throughout Telmex's region of coverage. In 2002,
over 98 percent of consumers in Telmex regions lived in cities or towns
with at least one alternative long-distance carrier. 96 Over 75 percent of
consumers in Telmex regions lived in cities or towns served by five or
more long-distance competitors.97
95. AT&T Motion I, supra note 88, at para. 57 (stating that the greater the capacity of
existing competitors to expand supply and the lower the barriers to entry, the more elastic
the supply can be judged to be).
96. Telmex: Competitive Environment Analysis (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Competitive Environment Analysis]. See THE WORLD GAZETrEER, MEXico 2004, available
at http://www.world-gazetteer.com/fr/fr_mx.htm (last visited November 28, 2004)
[hereinafter WORLD GAZErEER].
97. Competitive Environment Analysis. See WORLD GAZETrEER.
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TABLE 4
COMPETING LONG-DISTANCE CARRIERS IN TELMEX REGIONS, 2002
Number of Cities Served Population Living in Percentage of Customers
Facilities- byX Areas Served with Access to at Least X
Based by X Competitors Competitors.
Competitors (in thousands)
9 2 9,997 24.4 %
8 4 4,404 35.2 %
7 10 5,167 47.9 %
6 17 6,331 63.4 %
5 20 5,597 77.1 %
4 16 2,522 83.2 %
3 17 1,405 86.7 %
2 36 1,632 90.7 %
1 47 2,999 98.0 %
0 29 805 100.0%
Source: Telmex: Competitive Environment Analysis (on file with authors); THE
WORLD GAZETrEER, MEXICO 2004, available at http://www.world-
gazetteer.com/fr/frmx.htm (last visited October 14, 2004).
Note: Population data were not available for five of the cities served by one
competitor and seven of the cities served only by Telmex. The total population for
these two rows is obtained by applying the average population of cities for which
population data were available in each of these two rows to the cities for which
data were unavailable. The resulting population likely overstates the true amount
somewhat because it is probable that population data were unavailable because the
cities were especially small.
As Table 4 shows, the presence of so many facilities-based long-
distance competitors, and the ability of those competitors to interconnect to
Telmex's network, indicates that they could absorb most of Telmex's
current long-distance subscribers without additional dedicated or shared
(downstream) investment.
Of course, the WTO did not need to rely on cost estimates to be able
to conclude that upstart long-distance providers could readily thwart
Telmex's exercise of market power. The rapid rate at which these long-
distance providers entered the market and gained market share speaks for
itself. Between January 1997 and January 2002, the long-distance market
share of Telmex fell by more than 30 percent.98 Beyond the importance of
98. Comisi6n Federal De Telecommuniciaciones, Communications Sector Program
2001-2006 4, at http://www.cft.gob.mx/html/presidencia/communicationsectorprogram.pdf
(stating "Specifically, the companies authorized to provide international long distance
services have captured around 30 percent of the traffic"). Cofetel notes, by way of
comparison, that it took eight years for international long-distance competitors in the United
States to achieve the same market share that competitors in Mexico achieved in only five
years. Id.
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their then-current market share, however, was the fact that these
competitors stood ready to provide service to Telmex's customers in nearly
every region of Mexico should Telmex attempt to exercise market power.
4. Telmex Did Not Enjoy Any Significant Advantage with Respect
to Cost Structure, Size, or Resources
The U.S. government argued that Telmex had substantial advantages
over its competitors with respect to international services:
Telmex has consistently retained most of the market for international
services originating within Mexico as a result of various competitive
advantages, including its vertical integration with its ubiquitous and
irreplaceable local network and inter-city facilities to parts of Mexico
without equal access, its ability to discriminate against competitors in
providing leased lines and interconnection within Mexico, and its
control of the largest share of the capacity available to provide
international services of any Mexican carrier. Telmex's market power
generally, and specifically in international services, is also evidenced
by its ability to set prices to consumers for origination of international
traffic well above what other Mexican carriers charge or what United
States carriers charge for identical traffic in the opposite direction, by
the relative inelasticity of demand for both originating and terminating
international services in Mexico, and by Telmex's consistently high
profitability. 99
This argument misrepresented a number of key facts and was not
persuasive on economic grounds. For example, the U.S. government
implied that Telmex set prices for outbound international calls that were
"well above what other Mexican carriers charge," despite the fact that
many of Telmex's competitors had complained that Telmex's international
long-distance prices are too low. °°
Each factor cited by the U.S. government as "evidence" that Telmex
enjoyed "various competitive advantages" over rivals was either irrelevant
or misleading. First, the United States attempted to posit Telmex's vertical
integration as a competitive advantage, but ignored the fact that the
Mexican affiliates of the U.S. long-distance carriers are also vertically
integrated.'0 ' Second, the United States cited Telmex's "ubiquitous and
99. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 98.
100. Id.
101. Indeed, at the time that the U.S. government filed its complaint with the WTO,
AT&T and WorldCom were investors in two of Telmex's principal competitors. Although
WorldCom subsequently declared bankruptcy after committing the largest fraud ever
witnessed in the telecommunications industry, over the relevant time period WorldCom and
AT&T did not lack resources or expertise relative to Telmex. See generally J. Gregory
Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American
Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (2003) (discussing the
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irreplaceable local network" as a competitive advantage, yet failed to
mention that, for 92.5 percent of Telmex's lines, customers could
presubscribe to the service of a competing long-distance carrier. Third, the
United States pointed to Telmex's "inter-city facilities to parts of Mexico
without equal access," but did not explain that these "parts" comprised only
7.5 percent of Telmex's lines. Fourth, the United States claimed that
Telmex had the ability to "discriminate against competitors in providing
leased lines and interconnection within Mexico," even though there was no
evidence that Telmex had such ability.
Finally, the very phenomenon to which the United States claimed
Telmex's purported competitive advantages contributed was itself
nonexistent. Although the United States government claimed that Telmex
had "consistently retained most of the market for international services
originating within Mexico," Telmex's share of international long-distance
revenues had not been consistent at all. Indeed, as Figure 3 demonstrates,
Telmex had lost over a third of the market for international long-distance
between January 1997 and January 2002.
C. Even If the Market Definition Had Been the Termination of
Southbound Calls, Telmex Lacked Market Power
The U.S. government did not undertake a standard antitrust analysis
of the relevant product market. Instead, it defined the relevant product
market as "termination of voice telephony, facsimile and circuit-switched
data transmission services supplied on a cross-border basis from the United
States into Mexico.""1 2 The U.S. government used the following reasoning
to reach this narrow market definition:
The Mexican competition authority, the Comisi6n Federal de
Competencia ("CFC"), determined in 1998 and reaffirmed in 2001 that
international long distance service is a relevant market for which there
are "no close substitutes," and that such service is distinct from
domestic local, access, long distance or carrier toll services. This
determination was made for the purpose of identifying the broad
categories of service in which Telmex would be subject to regulation
as a dominant carrier. Accordingly, the CFC's category of international
services included several types of switched and non-switched
telecommunications services, among which, significantly, were
international port services for switching and routing of both originating
and terminating international traffic. The CFC's analysis clearly
applied to termination of cross-border traffic, as the CFC recognized
that the international ports "permit the accounting of international
traffic and compliance with the proportional return scheme set forth in
United States' attempt to deregulate telecommunications).
102. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 81.
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the regulations," that is, Mexico's requirements for termination of
international traffic, as discussed below. The CFC also recognized that
each international route between Mexico and another country, such as
the United States, "constitutes a geographic market."' 0 3
This reasoning is unsound on economic grounds and does not support
the conclusion that Telmex could exercise market power. The U.S.
government also did not provide a compelling justification for the
exclusion of packet-switched telecommunications services from the
relevant product market. Packet-switched telecommunications services are
an effective substitute to services that use Mexico's circuit-switched
network. Furthermore, the importance of packet-switched
telecommunications will only increase as data communications services
become more popular.
1. The Critical Share of Marginal Customers Needed to Render an
Exercise of Market Power by Telmex Unprofitable Would Be
Small
Telmex was the sole carrier authorized to negotiate with the U.S.
carriers over the international settlement rate for all telecommunications
traffic from the United States that was legally terminated in Mexico."°4
However, Telmex had no ability to negotiate over the rate for traffic that
U.S. carriers terminated illegally in Mexico by bypassing interconnection
with an authorized gateway at the Mexican border. For example, the U.S.
carrier could simply use a short microwave link to send a call across the
border to an unauthorized gateway, which would then make the call appear
to originate in Mexico. To the extent that this simple bypass occurred, it
strengthened the negotiating position of the U.S. long-distance carriers
relative to their counterparts in Mexico, and it prevented Telmex from
setting an international settlement rate that approached a monopoly price.
It is likely that termination of southbound calls from the United States
onto wireless networks and onto rival wireline networks through bypass
methods constrained the pricing of terminating access onto Telmex's
wireline network. From an antitrust perspective, the relevant question
should have been: Could a hypothetical, unregulated monopoly supplier of
the service in question (in this case, terminating access onto Telmex's
wireline network) profitably sustain a 5 percent price increase for a
103. Id. at para. 75 (quoting Comisi6n Federal de Competencia, Teldfonos de Mexico,
Declaratoria de Poder Sustancial en Diversos Mercados Relacionados con la Telefonfa
(Statement of Substantial Power in Different Telephone Markets), File No. AD-41-97, at
18-19 (24-26 in Spanish original) (May 21, 2001)).
104. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 241.
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substantial time period, usually assumed to be two years?"°5 To answer this
standard question in antitrust cases, one conducts "critical share"
analysis. 
106
If Telmex were to raise its prices for terminating access of
southbound calls, some U.S. carriers would substitute away from
terminating their calls onto Telmex's wireline network (for example,
through illegally bypassing the authorized points of international
connection). Define the original price for terminating a call onto Telmex's
wireline network as Po, and the associated derived demand for terminating
access onto Telmex's wireline network (measured in minutes) as Qo. When
the price of terminating access increases to P1, the number of terminating
minutes demanded falls to Q1. Let c denote Telmex's marginal cost of
providing terminating access. The decrease in the volume of calls due to
the price increase is the difference between Qo and Q, which are the
"marginal" minutes. The remaining minutes, Q1, are the "inframarginal"
minutes.
Telmex would raise its price for terminationzonto its wireline network
by 5 percent if the profits after the price increase would exceed the profits
before the price increase. The profitability of a 5 percent price increase
depends on the firm's own-price elasticity of demand. That comparison of
profits can be expressed algebraically as the following:
[1] (1.05 Po - c) Qi > (Po - c) Qo.
The (own-price) elasticity of derived demand for termination onto
Telmex's wireline network is the percent decrease in terminating minutes
for every 1 percent increase in Telmex's price for terminating access. A
constant elasticity demand curve implies:
[2] Q,/Qo = (P1 /Po).
Substituting this definition of elasticity into equation 2 and canceling
terms yields:
[3] (1.05 Po- c) (P/ Po) > (Po - c).
Dividing both sides by the new margin per minute and taking
logarithms yields:
[4] log [1.05] > log[Po - c] - log[l.05 P0 - c].
Equation 4 can be used to determine whether Telmex could raise the
price of terminating access and increase its profits. In other words,
Equation 4 indicates the own-price elasticity of demand for Telmex that
105. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 77, at 1-2, § 0.1.
106. See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 477-79
(1999).
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would be necessary to defeat a 5 percent price increase.
Consider a critical-share analysis of traffic patterns in Zone 2
Mexican cities (approximately 200 medium-sized cities). 11 7 A similar
analysis could be performed for Zone I and Zone 3 cities. Using an initial
terminating price of 8.5 cents per minute and a marginal cost of 3 cents per
minute,'0 8 the critical level of elasticity for the price increase to be
profitable is -1.5. If the own-price elasticity of demand for terminating
access onto Telmex's wireline network is less than -1.5 (that is, if the own-
price elasticity is greater than 1.5 in absolute terms), then Telmex could not
profitably raise the price of termination.
As explained earlier, the market own-price elasticity of demand for
southbound services was between -1.2 and -2.4. Using Marshall's Laws of
Derived Demand, 09 one can estimate that the elasticity of demand for
terminating access onto Telmex's wireline network (the only input in the
production of the final service to U.S. consumers) is also between -1.2 and
-2.4. In particular, when an input represents 100 percent of the cost of
supplying the final service, which is the case for terminating access and
southbound long-distance service, the own-price elasticity of demand for
the input equals the own-price elasticity of demand for the final service. 1°
Hence, under conservative estimations of the elasticity of demand for
terminating access onto Telmex's wireline network during the relevant time
period, Telmex could not have raised its prices for terminating access,
thereby increasing its profits. That is, Telmex lacked market power.
Another way to consider critical share is in terms of the critical level
of lost output. Using Equation 2 and the above estimate of the own-price
elasticity of derived demand for termination, if Telmex were to lose 7.2
percent of its terminating minutes from U.S. carriers, then Telmex would
not be willing to raise its price by 5 percent. Telmex estimated that in 2001
black-market calls displaced up to 18 percent of its international revenue."'
Because 18 percent of southbound traffic represents more than the critical
share of 7.2 percent, Telmex could not have increased its profit by raising
the price of terminating access. That is, during the relevant time period
Telmex lacked market power in the termination of southbound traffic.
107. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 130(b).
108. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 118.
109. For a discussion of Marshall's rules of derived demand, see P.R.G. LAYARD & A.A.
WALTERS, MICROECONOMic THEORY 259-62 (1978).
110. Id.
111. TELMEX, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (June 2002) (on file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission), available at http://www.telmex.com/explorer/esto/pdfs/
annual01.pdf.
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2. Countervailing Market Power of U.S. Long-Distance Carriers in
the Bilateral Negotiation of International Settlement Rates
The U.S. government argued that Telmex had been able to extract
supracompetitive profits from the international settlement rates as a result
of its superior negotiating position. Although Telmex was the sole
negotiator on behalf of all Mexican firms, it could not impose
supracompetitive rates on U.S. carriers because those carriers had
substantial market power over the southbound U.S.-Mexico route. The
market for calls from the United States into Mexico was highly
concentrated. As Table 2 shows, the HHI. IE of market concentration
between 1994 and 2000 was quite high-above 4,000 every year-and in
2000, the index increased by more than 2,000 to 6,215.
If Telmex had been negotiating international settlement rates with a
number of small U.S. carriers, the U.S. government's contention might
have been plausible. But it was not plausible that Telmex held a vastly
superior position in negotiations over the international settlement rate. In
1999 and 2000, more than 90 percent of the market for southbound calls
into Mexico was controlled by two U.S. carriers that had identical
negotiation objectives vis-A-vis Telmex.
3. Telmex Offered Termination Access at a Price that Complied
with the ITU's Target Rate and Was Substantially Below the
Benchmark Settlement Rate that the FCC Established to Protect
U.S. Long-Distance Carriers
Mexico's international settlement rates in 2002113 were among the
lowest 20 percent of all published settlement rates for the thirty-five
countries in Mexico's teledensity group.14 Teledensity is a measure of the
number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Mexico's teledensity group
included the thirty-two countries that had between ten and twenty
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Based on these data, Mexico's 2002
international settlement rates complied with the target international
settlement rates set forward by the International Telecommunications
Union ("ITU"). 15 Telmex's international settlement rate was significantly
112. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 60, at 247. By way of comparison for the
HHI numbers for southbound international calls, the Merger Guidelines consider a post-
merger HHI above 1,800 to be highly concentrated. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 77, at 16, § 1.51c.
"3 IMTS ACCOUNTING RATES, supra note 70.
114. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, WORLD TELECOMMUNICATION
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: REINVENTING TELECOMS (2002) at A8-11.
1 15. Id. In March 1999, the World Telecommunication Policy Forum ("WVTPF") adopted
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
below the benchmark settlement rate that the FCC established to protect
U.S. long-distance carriers (a maximum of 11.75 cents in Zone 3 cities
versus the FCC benchmark rate of 19.0 cents)." 6 Indeed, the difference
between the actual settlement rate and the FCC Benchmark rate
demonstrates the countervailing market power of the U.S. carriers in the
rate-setting process.
4. The Absence of International Simple Resale Did Not Give
Telmex Market Power in the Termination of Southbound Calls
The WTO panel rejected the argument that Mexico's policies toward
non-facilities-based service providers violated that nation's various treaty
commitments. The U.S. government had argued that the ILD Rules
"prohibit alternative arrangements for the delivery and termination of
international calls in Mexico, such as those available in many other
countries for the origination and termination of international traffic over
international private lines-also known as 'international simple resale' or
'ISR' services." 7 Contrary to that assertion, Telmex could not have
exercised market power in the termination of southbound calls even if the
Mexican government continued its policy of not mandating the unbundling
of Telmex's long-distance capacity. There is not now, and there was not at
the time of the WTO case, any barrier to entry into facilities-based
provision of southbound long-distance service in Mexico. Indeed, at the
time of the WTO case, the Mexican affiliates of AT&T and WorldCom-
Alestra and Avantel-already operated their own fiber-optic long-distance
facilities, on which U.S. carriers could lease capacity to transport their
southbound calls from the United States. In other words, whether facilities-
based entry was possible was not a hypothetical question. It had already
happened. Any supposed barriers to the facilities-based entry were not so
high that they could not be surmounted. The mandatory, rate-regulated ISR
an opinion setting up a Focus Group to study transitional arrangements towards cost
orientation for the period 1999-2001. The Focus Group created a report entitled Annex E to
Recommendation D140, which contained target settlement rates. See INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, CHARGING AND ACCOUNTING IN INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: ITU-T RECOMMENDATION D.140, Annex E (1996), at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/intset/itu-t/dl40/d 140_e_23621.html.
116. FCC, UNITED STATES IMTS NET SETrLEMENT PAYMENTS, 1985-2000 (April 9,
2002) at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pd/pf/nsp.xls; IMTS ACCOUNTING RATES, supra note 70. For
a complete description of Telmex's interconnection rates provided to U.S. suppliers, see
WorldCom's Petition for Waiver of the International Settlements Policy for a Change in
Accounting Rate for International Message Telephone Services with Telefonos de Mexico
S.A. De C.V., Public Notice, attachment 1 (May 6, 2002), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-02-1251 A 1.txt.
117. United States Government Written Submission, supra note 1, at para. 8.
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that the U.S. government asked the WTO to impose would have added
nothing to the competitiveness of the market for international calling
between Mexico and the United States, given that U.S. carriers already had
alternative facilities with ample capacity available to them at competitive
prices. Posing the question in these terms highlights the difference between
the welfare of consumers and the welfare of competitors."1 8
So why did the U.S. government seek mandatory ISR? The most
plausible economic answer is that mandatory ISR would enlarge the
already high margins that U.S. long-distance carriers reaped on the
southbound route. The regulated price for mandatory ISR could never
exceed the arms-length market price for such capacity. That was certainly
the United States' experience from the hundreds of arbitrations by which
state public utilities commissions in 1996 and 1997 set wholesale discounts
that incumbent local exchange carriers were required to offer to their
competitors pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996." 9 As the
principal beneficiaries, AT&T, WorldCom, and Sprint were sophisticated
participants in those hundreds of rate proceedings. The United States'
experience suggested that strategic use of the WTO complaint process
could override the Mexican regulatory process and produce a lower price
for resale than the market price. A form of regulatory arbitrage would
result. A U.S. carrier would divert traffic from its affiliated carrier in
Mexico if the transfer price that the two carriers had struck by arms-length
agreement exceeded the below-market price that the WTO compelled
Telmex (through the Mexican government) to offer as a result of the
imposition of mandatory ISR.
In light of the widening margins that U.S. long-distance carriers have
earned on the southbound route, it could not even be said that the
regulatory arbitrage resulting from mandatory, rate-regulated ISR would
have subsidized U.S. consumers calling Mexico. Rather, U.S. carriers
would have captured for themselves the lion's share of the difference
between the market price and the regulated price for international
wholesale capacity on Telmex's network. Nothing in the 1997 WTO
Agreement or the 1996 Reference Paper remotely suggested that one
signatory nation must compel its incumbent carrier to subsidize the
operations of equally experienced carriers from another signatory nation.
The U.S. government evidently thought otherwise.
118. See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer- Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999).
119. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons:
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081, 1082-83 (1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The WTO embraced most of the U.S. government's policy
preferences. It is unlikely that consumers in the United States and Mexico
are any better off than if Cofetel had been permitted to oversee Mexico's
domestic regulatory reform. As the international settlement rate is lowered
to LRAIC, Telmex will have less incentive on the margin to invest to
upgrade and maintain its networks. To restore that incentive, Telmex will
have to generate an offsetting amount of incremental net revenue from its
other services in Mexico. Doing so will have the marginal effect of slowing
growth in demand for those services. Perhaps the U.S. government believes
that U.S. consumers benefit when Mexican consumers lose. That reasoning
would be fallacious, however, because it ignores the network effects in
telecommunications. U.S. consumers benefit from a more ubiquitous
network in Mexico. Consequently, the U.S. government's success at the
WTO will hurt its own consumers, contrary to stated U.S. policy. The sole
beneficiaries of the U.S. policy appear to be U.S. long-distance carriers,
which in all likelihood will widen their margins on calls from the U.S. to
Mexico.
Mandatory international simple resale would have undermined
Cofetel's efforts to spur facilities-based competition. A U.S. carrier that
wants to establish a connection between the United States and Mexico has
the choice of building its own facility in Mexico (through its Mexican
affiliate) or interconnecting, either through paying access charges to a
Mexican carrier or leasing a line from a Mexican carrier. Non-facilities-
based competition has been a failure in the United States, largely because
carriers that rely too heavily on an incumbent's facilities are incapable of
offering distinct or innovative services, and can therefore only compete on
price. The sole bright spot in the WTO decision was its rejection of
mandatory ISR.
The policies advocated by the U.S. government before the WTO
advanced the private interests of AT&T, Sprint, and WorldCom while
depriving U.S. consumers of a more ubiquitous telecommunications
network in North America. Those policies successfully overturned the
informed judgments of an independent regulatory authority in Mexico that,
consistent with principles of the WTO agreement and its associated
Reference Paper, had based its decisions on expertise and detailed
knowledge concerning the industry that it regulates.
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